A Matter of Opinion: Diciphering Dilution under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act by Ablin, Karyn K. & Koshy, Anil
Mississippi College Law Review 
Volume 20 
Issue 2 Vol. 20 Iss. 2 Article 5 
2000 
A Matter of Opinion: Diciphering Dilution under the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act 
Karyn K. Ablin 
Anil Koshy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Custom Citation 
20 Miss. C. L. Rev. 245 (1999-2000) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Mississippi College Law Review by an authorized editor of MC Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact walter@mc.edu. 
A MATTER OF OPINION: DECIPHERING DILUTION UNDER THE
FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT
Karyn K. Ablin andAnil Koshy*
In 1995, Congress enacted the Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("Dilution Act"
or "Act"),' which added a powerful new arrow to the quiver of the federal protec-
tion scheme for trademarks as embodied by the Lanham Act.' Specifically,
trademark owners, for the first time, gained federal protection against the unau-
thorized use of identical or substantially similar trademarks that diluted the dis-
tinctive quality of their famous trademarks.
Congress enacted the Dilution Act in order to protect famous marks under a
single, national system,' which would supplement the "patch-quilt system of pro-
tection" provided by anti-dilution laws then available in just over one-half of the
states.' The Dilution Act's expected benefits included a decreased incentive to
forum shop and the prevention of needless litigation in several states to enforce
the same right.'
Despite Congress's goal of standardizing dilution protection throughout the
country, judicial construction of the Act in the scant few years since its enact-
ment is strangling the hope for a single, national standard of dilution. As cases
applying the Dilution Act wend their way through the federal judicial system,
courts have interpreted the Act in dramatically disparate ways. For example,
* Ms. Ablin is an attorney at the Washington, D.C. law firm of Wiley, Rein & Fielding, and Mr. Koshy is an
attorney at the Palo Alto, California law firm of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati. Wiley, Rein & Fielding
served as counsel for Kohler Co. in IP Lund TradingApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F3d 27 (Ist Cir. 1998), a case that
is discussed in this Article. The authors would like to thank Dineen Pashoukos Wasylik, an attorney at Wiley,
Rein & Fielding, for her assistance in preparing this Article for publication.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (Supp. IV 1998)).
2. Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-1127) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
3. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031 ("Protection for famous
marks should not depend upon whether the forum where the suit is filed has a dilution statute.").
4. See id. at 3, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030. As of January 1996, twenty-eight states had
enacted dilution statutes (current codification listed unless otherwise noted). See ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 (1999);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-113 (Michie 1995) (amended 1998); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1999);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-11 i(c) (West 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 495.151 (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451 (1994); IDAHO CODE § 48-512 (1995) (amended 1997); 765
ILL. COmp. STAT. 1036/15 (1993) (codified as amended at 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1036/65 (1999)); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 548.113 (West 1998); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:223.1 (West 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I IOB,
§ 12 (West 1999); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 333.285 (West 1999);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 417.061 (West 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-334 (1997); NEB.'REV. STAT. § 87-122
(1998) (superseded by 2000 NEB. LAWS L.B. 626); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 350-A:12 (1998); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 56:3-13.20 (West 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3-10 (Michie 1996) (codified as amended at N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 57-3B-15 (Michie 1999)); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 360-1 (McKinney 1999); OR. REv. STAT. § 647.107 (1998);
54 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1124 (West 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-2-12 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-15-1165
(Law. Co-op. 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-512 (1998) (superseded by TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-513
(West 2000)); TEx. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (Vernon 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.77.160 (West
1999).
Since that time, six other states have enacted dilution statutes, bringing the total count of states with dilution
protection, as of October 2000, to thirty-four. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.180(d) (Michie 1998); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 44-1448.01 (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 81-214 (1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-25-25 (1999); W, VA.
CODE § 47-2-13 !(1999); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-115 (Michie 1999).
5. H.R. RE! No. 104-374, at 4-5 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031 (observing that lack
of a single national standard encourages forum shopping and increases the amount of litigation).
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courts disagree about the showing necessary to satisfy the fame requirement of
the Act,' including the extent of geographic renown necessary to trigger applica-
tion of the Act' and whether fame must be proved in the general marketplace as
opposed to the specific sub-market of the trademark owner.8 Because the Act
sets forth a non-exclusive list of eight factors for courts to consider when making
determinations of fame,9 however, courts at least have substantial congressional
guidance regarding the relevant considerations on which to base the fame
inquiry. Judicial disputes center around whether the requisite level of fame has
been attained given the facts of the specific case.
More intractable is the judicial dispute over what constitutes dilution itself, an
inquiry for which there is considerably less congressional guidance. Congress
did not break down the dilution analysis into factors, as it did for the fame
requirement. Instead, it tersely and somewhat cryptically defined dilution as "the
lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services, regardless of the presence or absence of (I) competition between the
owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mis-
take, or deception."1
This definition has proved to be fertile ground for judicial disagreement.
Indeed, courts have adopted or created no fewer than four different tests for ana-
lyzing dilution claims. Several courts have employed a six-factor test developed
by Judge Sweet" in his concurring opinion in Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota
Motor Sales, US.A., Inc., 2 which interpreted New York's anti-dilution statute.
The Fourth Circuit has developed a second test in Ringling Bros.-Barnum &
Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development, a which
requires, inter alia, that the plaintiff prove actual economic harm caused by the
defendant before the protection of the Dilution Act is triggered.' The Second
Circuit has created a third open-ended test in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.,"5
which combines a few of the factors listed in the Sweet test with some new
ones." Finally, in LP Lund TradingApS v. Kohler Co.," the First Circuit outlined
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
7. Compare Star Mkts., Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 950 F Supp. 1030, 1034-35 (D. Haw. 1996) (rejecting theory
that fame within a small local market satisfies the fame requirement of the Dilution Act), with Gazette
Newspapers, Inc. v. New Paper, Inc., 934 F Supp. 688, 694-96 (D. Md. 1996) (holding that fame within some
Maryland suburbs constitutes sufficient geographic fame for purposes of the Dilution Act).
8. Compare Washington Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Authorities, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 488, 503-04
(E.D. Va. 1999) (criticizing theory that fame within a niche market meets the fame requirements of the Dilution
Act), affdi, 217 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 2000), with Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C.,
212 F3d 157, 164-65 (3d Cir. 2000) (observing that niche market fame meets fame requirements of Dilution
Act), Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633, 640-41 (7th Cir. 1999) (same), and
Teletech Customer Care Mgmt., Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F Supp. 1407, 1413 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (same).
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
10. Id. § 1127.
II. See infra note 99.
12. 875 F.2d 1026, 1035-40 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 368-d) (Sweet, J., concurring).
13. 170 F.3d 449, 463-65 (4th Cir. 1999).
14. Id. at 461. The Fifth Circuit recently adopted the Fourth Circuit's test. See Westchester Media v. PRL
USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 670-71 (5th Cir. 2000).
15. 191 F.3d 208, 217-22 (2d Cir. 1999).
16. Id. The Third Circuit recently adopted the Second Circuit's test. See Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v.
Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 169 (3d Cir. 2000).
17. 163 F.3d 27, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1998).
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a test that considers only the consumer perception of the virtual identity of the
trademarks. 8
In light of the revolutionary nature of dilution, it is of little wonder that courts
disagree about the appropriate test for its existence. The concept of dilution is
foreign to the bedrock of trademark protection, trademark infringement.
Whereas trademark infringement laws only operate when consumers are likely to
be confused as to the source or sponsorship of a product, trademark dilution laws
offer much broader protection against the unauthorized use of identical or similar
trademarks because they operate even when there is no consumer source confu-
sion. 9 Thus, courts historically have treated state anti-dilution statutes with sus-
picion and hostility,2" often interpreting the statutes in ways that rendered protec-
tion against dilution a nullity. 1 As a result, today's courts cannot reliably look to
previous decisions for guidance in understanding dilution.
Nor can courts turn exclusively to the language of the Dilution Act itself for
clarification. Although the language of the Act is the appropriate starting point
for any exercise in statutory interpretation,22 the Act's definition of dilution has
proved sufficiently vague to give birth to a multiplicity of understandings of dilu-
tion.
Nonetheless, there are better and worse tests for dilution. Most importantly, a
proper dilution test must fit the congressional intent embodied in the language of
the statute and given shape in the Act's legislative history. Furthermore, while
there has been substantial disagreement about the exact nature of dilution,2 3 most
discussions about dilution cluster around a core concept of the gradual loss of a
trademark's ability to distinguish goods or services upon which it is affixed. A
valid test for dilution should be faithful to this concept. Finally, where not in
conflict with the first two criteria, a good test for dilution will respect judicial
concerns regarding the potentially sweeping effect of dilution laws and limit dilu-
tion claims to those trademarks truly deserving of such potent protection.24
It is by these criteria, with particular importance placed on Congress's intent in
enacting the Dilution Act, that this Article measures the four tests announced by
18. Id. at 50.
19. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 125(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (prohibiting unauthorized use of trademarks that
are "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the... origin, sponsorship, or approval
of" trademark owner's goods or services), with id. § 1125(c) (stating that dilution applies "regardless of the
presence or absence of... likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception").
20. David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REv. 531, 546 (1991) (noting that
"federal courts generally were hostile to the idea of dilution" and that courts "expressed reservations (about]
stringent application of antidilution statutes").
21. Note, Dilution: Trademark Infringement or Will-O'-The- Wisp?, 77 HARV. L. REV. 520, 528 (1964) (dis-
cussing "[t]he persistence and ingenuity displayed by able federal judges in drawing the teeth of state dilution
statutes").
22. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) ("As in any case of statutory con-
struction, [the] analysis begins with the language of the statute." (internal quotations omitted)); Ardestani v.
INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135 (1991) ("The starting point in statutory interpretation is the language (of the statute]
itself." (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original)).
23. Jonathan E. Moskin, Dilution or Delusion: The Rational Limits of Trademark Protection, 83
TRADEMARK REP. 122, 123 (1993) ("[T]here is no accepted statutory or case law definition of the concept [of
dilution]... ').
24. This is not unlike the practice of reading a statute narrowly when the statute is in derogation of common
law. See Reed Dickerson, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATuTrEs 206-08, 228 (1975).
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courts in applying the Act. Part I of the Article discusses the pre-dilution regime
of trademark protection under the traditional trademark infringement laws as
well as the early development of the concept of dilution as a respect for, and pro-
tection of, a unique relationship between a mark and the products that it identi-
fies. Part II examines the definition of dilution in the Dilution Act and the leg-
islative history of the Act to ascertain Congress's understanding of dilution. Part
III examines Judge Sweet's test for dilution, which provided an initial analytical
framework that many courts have applied to determine Dilution Act claims, but
rejects that test as improperly conflating dilution claims with infringement
claims. Part IV examines the three tests for dilution that circuit courts have
developed under the Dilution Act: the Ringling Bros. "economic harm" test, the
Nabisco "open-ended" test, and the Lund "virtual identity" test. This Article
finds that while the "economic harm" and "open-ended" tests do not properly
adhere to the core concept of dilution or effectuate congressional intent embod-
ied in the Dilution Act, the "virtual identity" test does implement congressional
intent and does so in a manner that alleviates judicial concerns regarding the
overbreadth of dilution protection. The Article concludes by suggesting that the
First Circuit's "virtual identity" test is most consistent with congressional intent
and the core concept of dilution and therefore is the test that courts should fol-
low. Otherwise, the Act, instead of "bring[ing] uniformity and consistency to the
protection of famous marks,""5 will merely provide trademark owners with a sec-
ond patch-work quilt system of protection overlaying the varying state regimes.
I. THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF DILUTION
A. Pre-Dilution Trademark Protection
Until well into the twentieth century, trademark law consisted solely of protec-
tion from trademark infringement.2" Unlike patent and copyright laws, which
offer absolute rights to intellectual property owners,27 trademark infringement
laws grant a far more limited right to a trademark owner by allowing him or her
to protect a trademark "only insofar as it is necessary to prevent consumer confu-
sion as to who produced the goods [bearing the mark] and to facilitate the differ-
entiation of the.., goods."28 As one commentator noted:
25. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
26. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
27. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275 (observing that trade-
mark laws do not authorize "monopolistic grants like patents and copyrights").
28. International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980); see also
Prestonettes, Inc. v. Cory, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) ("A trade-mark only gives the right to prohibit the use of it
so far as to protect the owner's good will against the sale of another's product as his."); United Drug Co. v.
Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (highlighting "the fundamental error of supposing that a trade-
mark right is a right in gross or at large, like a statutory copyright or a patent for an invention, to either of
which, in truth, it has little or no analogy"); id. at 97-98 ("The owner of a trade-mark may not, like the propri-
etor of a patented invention, make a negative and merely prohibitive use of it as a monopoly."); Kohler Co. v.
Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that "trademark protection is relatively weak because it pre-
cludes competitors only from using marks that are likely to confuse or deceive the public").
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The Supreme Court has continuously held that the trademark right is "not in
gross" and not a copyright or a patent, but that any rights to trademarks are
appurtenant to the related business. The purpose is to exclude others from con-
fusing usages, not to grant a monopoly in the mark in gross."
The reason for this difference in protection is grounded in the goals of the
respective intellectual property regimes. Patent and copyright laws aim to foster
innovation by granting an intellectual property owner absolute protection in the
owner's creative work or invention for a limited time.3" Trademark infringement
laws, by contrast, primarily protect consumers by assisting them in their purchas-
ing decisions. 1 Specifically, trademarks serve an important informational role in
the marketplace by allowing "a purchaser to identify goods or services that have
been satisfactory in the past and reject goods or services that have failed to give
satisfaction."32  This information signaling function of trademarks encourages
companies to produce quality products on a consistent basis and reduces con-
sumer search costs in locating those products.'
Because the public usefulness of a trademark lies entirely in the mark's ability
to signal source information ' to consumers, it is this ability-and only this abili-
ty-that must be protected. Without such protection, a trademark upon which
consumers depend for information could be unscrupulously or even inadvertently
used in ways that mislead consumers about the source of the goods purchased.
Such misuse would have its own miserable progeny-as misled consumers pur-
chased products from sources they would not ordinarily trust, those consumers
would cease to rely upon the trademark as a useful signal of source information.
Eventually, the trademark's usefulness as a signal to consumers would disappear
altogether.
To preserve this source-signaling ability of a trademark, the trademark
infringement regime guards against only those uses of a trademark on a product
29. Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute
Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433, 466-67 (1994).
30. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power "[tio promote the Progress of Science and
the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries").
31. See James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 E2d 266, 276 (7th Cir. 1976) (observing that
trademark regime exists "not to 'protect' trademarks, but ... to protect the consuming public from confusion,
concomitantly protecting the trademark owner's right to a non-confused public").
32. See I J. THOMAS McCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 2:3 (4th ed.
1996).
33. See I id. § 2:4 ("[T]rademarks create an incentive to keep up a good reputation for a predictable quality
of goods."); Lisa H. Johnston, Drifting Towards Trademark Rights in Gross, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 19, 20 (1995)
("[Tirademarks perform an important role in facilitating the free flow of information to the consumer and
thereby reduce market place transaction costs."); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of
Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1690 (1999) (observing that economists have "emphasized the efficiency
by which trademarks and advertising communicate useful information to consumers").
34. As used in this Article, "source" refers broadly to the origin, affiliation and/or sponsorship of a good or
service.
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that are likely to confuse consumers about the source of the product. 3
Trademark infringement laws do not prevent all uses of another's mark or similar
marks-for example, uses in which the subsequent mark user's product is vastly
different from that of the prior user and as a result is unlikely to be thought by
consumers to be produced or sponsored by the senior user. As Judge Learned
Hand commented: "There is indeed a limit; the goods on which the supposed
infringer puts the mark may be too remote from any that the owner would be
likely to make or sell. It would be hard, for example, for the seller of a steam
shovel to find ground for complaint in the use of his trade-mark on a lipstick."'
In such cases, the trademark owner cannot enjoin the use of his or her mark
because the signaling function of the trademark with respect to his or her product
line remains unimpaired.
In short, the pre-dilution intellectual property landscape consisted of the patent
and copyright regimes on one hand, offering absolute intellectual property pro-
tection, and trademark infringement laws on the other, protecting only against
consumer source confusion. No stronger trademark protection than the "likeli-
hood of confusion" standard was perceived to be necessary in order to achieve
the trademark regime's purpose of ensuring that consumers draw accurate con-




Professor Frank Schechter dramatically altered the perceived trademark land-
scape when he introduced the concept of dilution to the United States in his 1927
article, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection." As Professor Schechter
recognized, the idea of trademark dilution as a harm that must be prevented con-
35. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1 Ltd., 155 F3d 526, 543 (5th Cir. 1998) ("The touchstone of infringe-
ment is whether the use creates a likelihood of confusion as to the 'source, affiliation, or sponsorship' of Tour
18's golf course."); American-Marietta Co. v. Krigsman, 275 F.2d 287, 289 (2d Cir. 1960) (Hand, J.) ("The
whole basis of the law of 'unfair competition' in this aspect is that no one shall sell his goods in such a way as
to make it appear that they come from some other source. The simplest form of this is to use the name or trade-
mark of another...."); I McCARrHY, supra note 32, § 2:1 ("The interest of the public in not being deceived
has been called the basic policy [of trademark law]."); l id. § 2:8 ("Today, the keystone of that portion of unfair
competition law which relates to trademarks is the avoidance of a likelihood of confusion in the minds of the
buying public."); Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for
Trademark Protection, 58 U. Prrr. L. REv. 789, 799 (1997) ("Trademark law, however, was concerned foremost
...with the consumers who were 'duped into dealing with an imposter."' (quoting Robert C. Denicola,
Trademarks As Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for Protection of Trade
Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 158, 160).
36. L.E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F2d 272, 273 (2d Cir. 1934) (Hand, J.).
37. Industrial Rayon Corp. v. Dutchess Underwear Corp., 92 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1937) ("The owner of a
mark acquires the right to prevent the goods to which the mark is applied from being confused with those of
others and to prevent his own trade from being diverted to competitors through their use of misleading marks.
There are no rights in a trade-mark beyond these.").
38. 40 HAtv. L. REv. 813 (1927); see also 4 McCARTHv, supra note 32, § 24:67 ("The concept [of dilution]
was first introduced into the United States in the 1920s and 1930s through the writings and congressional testi-
mony of Frank Schechter."). Cf Port, supra note 29, at 437 (observing that progenitor of concept existed out-
side of the United States). The term "dilution," never employed by Professor Schechter himself, appears to
come from his translation of a decision by a German court that held that a second mark "diluted" the first. See
Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 831-32 (1927).
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travened the then-prevailing understanding of both the function of trademarks
and the predominant justifications for their protection. 9
Schechter's concept of dilution is based upon a different understanding of the
role of trademarks than is traditional trademark law. Trademarks, Schechter
argued, no longer merely indicated the source of a good, but now served to sell
the good itself. A trademark was not merely "a symbol of good will," but also
"an agency for the actual creation and perpetuation of good will."' Its true func-
tions were "to identify a product as satisfactory and thereby... stimulate further
purchases by the consuming public."'" Schechter posited that this power of trade-
marks depended on the uniqueness and strength of the psychological connection
in the mind of the consumer between the mark and the product.'
This new role for trademarks meant that protection against only a likelihood of
confusion was insufficient.' Subsequent users of a mark could affix the mark to
dissimilar products without confusing the consumer as to the source of these
products. Such use, however, would diminish the link between the original user
of the mark and the mark itself." Protection against dilution, therefore, should
concern itself primarily with "the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the
identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-
competing goods."'" Professor Schechter was particularly concerned that if
strong, arbitrary trademarks such as KODAK were used to indicate a wide vari-
ety of different products produced by a number of different manufacturers, the
strong message that the mark owner wished to convey by the mark regarding the
goods to which the mark is affixed-well-made cameras, for example-would be
weakened by the mark's use by other manufacturers on other products. 1 In other
words, according to Schechter, protection against dilution was needed to guard
not so much against a consumer's inability to determine the source of a product,
but rather against the loss of the immediate favorable mental association, in the
mind of the consumer, between an owner's trademark and its products by pre-
serving the singularity and strength of that connection. 4
39. Schechter, supra note 38, at 824 (characterizing traditional trademark law as "hampered by obsolete
conceptions both as to the function of a trademark and as to the need for its protection").
40. Id. at 818.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 819 ("The mark actually sells the goods. And, self-evidently, the more distinctive the mark, the
more effective is its selling power."); id. at 831 (asserting that one principle of the concept of dilution is that the
selling power of a trademark "depends for its psychological hold upon the public, not merely upon the merit of
the goods upon which it is used, but equally upon its own uniqueness and singularity").
43. See id. at 821-22 (arguing that the idea that no harm is done absent consumer confusion is "an archaic
notion" that "ignores the fact that the creation and retention of custom, rather than the designation of source, is
the primary purpose of the trademark today, and that the preservation of the uniqueness or individuality of the
trademark is of paramount importance to its owner").
44. See id. at 825 (arguing that "the use of trademarks on entirely non-related goods may of itself concretely
injure the owner of the mark even in the absence [of confusion]").
45. Id.
46. See id. at 829-30 ("Should the rule [protecting only against confusion]... be literally adhered to, there
is not a single one of these fanciful marks which will not, if used on different classes of goods, . . . gradually
but surely lose its effectiveness and unique distinctiveness in the same way as has 'Star,' 'Blue Ribbon,' or
'Gold Medal."').
47. See id. at 830 (arguing that a trademark can establish a unique connection, such as that between the
phrase "Blue Goose" and oranges and grapefruit, and that absent protection that link may be broken).
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This was a broad protection vastly at odds with the conceptual underpinnings
of trademark infringement law. Unlike trademark infringement law, the theory of
dilution primarily protects the rights of the trademark owner rather than those of
the public.48 Moreover, the broad protection to exclude uses of a mark even when
there is no possibility of confusion resembles a property right in gross, much like
the protection offered by the patent and copyright laws rather than that provided
by the trademark infringement regime.9 But Schechter believed that such pro-
tection was necessary to protect what was, in his opinion, the true value of trade-
marks in the modern market economy.' Moreover, Schechter envisioned a slid-
ing scale of protection, in which "the degree of protection depend[ed] in turn
upon the extent to which, through the efforts or ingenuity of its owner, [the mark
was] actually unique and different from other marks."'" As a result, "arbitrary,
coined or fanciful marks or names should be given a much broader degree of
protection than symbols, words or phrases in common use."'
2. State Anti-Dilution Laws and Judicial Reaction
No federal dilution protection immediately resulted from Schechter's article.
Beginning in 1947, however, states began to enact anti-dilution statutes.5 By
January 1996, twenty-eight states had adopted such statutes. ' The vast majority
of those states used very similar language to describe anti-dilution protection,
which guarded against the "[l]ikelihood of injury to business reputation or of
dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark ... notwithstanding the absence of
competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of
goods or services."' Each state law provided injunctive relief.'
48. See id. (asserting that "the vast expenditures in advertising" used to build a trademark "should be pro-
tected to the same extent as plant and machinery"); see also H.R. REp. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030 (observing that the aim of dilution law is to recognize the "substantial invest-
ment the owner has made in the mark and the commercial value and aura of the mark itself").
49. See Schechter, supra note 38, at 822 (recognizing that many believe that "a limitation of the protection
of trademarks to goods of the same class logically and necessarily follows from the rule that there is no proper-
ty in a trademark"); see also Viacom, Inc. v. Ingram Enters., Inc., 141 F.3d 886, 890, 892 (8th Cir. 1998) (equat-
ing dilution protection with a "complete" and "nationwide monopoly"); 3 RUDOLF CALLMAN, THE LAW OF
UNFAIR COMPErrlON, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIEs § 84.2, at 960 (3d ed. 1969) ("Perhaps some of the resis-
tance to the doctrine of dilution is attributable to judicial unwillingness to recognize a trademark as property.");
Johnston, supra note 33, at 32, ("[T]he thrust of anti-dilution statutes is to bestow on the trademark owner a
right in gross to protect the trademark itself .... ); 4 McCARTHY, supra note 32, § 24:90 ("While traditional
trademark law rests primarily on a policy of protection of customers from mistake and deception, anti-dilution
law more closely resembles an absolute property right in a trademark."); Port, supra note 29, at 463 ("[T]o
grant dilution rights to a trademark holder is the same as giving the trademark holder a monopoly on the mark
as used in any context.").
50. See Schechter, supra note 38, at 831 (arguing that an understanding that the true function of trademarks
in the modem economy depends upon their uniqueness leads to the "conclusion that the preservation of the
uniqueness of a trademark should constitute the only rational basis for its protection").
51. Id.
52. Id. at 828; see also id. at 829 (noting that coined words "have been added to rather than withdrawn from
the human vocabulary by their owners").
53. See Klieger, supra note 35, at 811.
54. See supra note 4.
55. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE §14330 (West 1999); see also, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. IIOB, § 12
(West 1999); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 360-1 (McKinney 1999).
56. See supra note 4.
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Judicial reaction was hostile."' Dilution represented a very powerful weapon
with which to protect trademark rights. 8 Courts feared that dilution rights might
effectively give trademark owners monopolies in their marks-a concept that
was inconsistent with the country's strong preference for a competitive, market-
based economy."a Courts questioned whether the implied breadth was really
intended and became wary of a concept that seemed to turn traditional trademark
law on its head.'
In response, courts severely restricted the scope of dilution protection by
imposing prerequisites that were expressly prohibited by the text of the statutes.6 1
Specifically, despite the express command in many state statutes that the absence
of consumer source confusion was no bar to a finding of dilution, courts
nonetheless imposed precisely such a requirement." Thus, "the 'plain, literal
language' of the antidilution statutes was universally ignored, and the dilution
cause of action thoroughly 'emasculated,' in case after case."' Such judicial
57. Klieger, supra note 35, at 811 ("Although courts expressed initial fascination with dilution theory,
intrigue quickly turned to hostility ...."); see also Note, supra note 2 I, at 526-28 (describing the very narrow
reading given to the Massachusetts and New York dilution statutes).
58. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F2d 830, 836 (7th Cir. 1963) (describing the anti-dilution
protection under the Illinois statute as "lay[ing] a heavy hand upon one who adopts the trade name or mark of
another").
59. See, e.g., Coffee Dan's Inc. v. Coffee Don's Charcoal Broiler, 305 F Supp. 1210, 1217 n.13 (N.D. Cal.
1969) (expressing concern over anti-dilution doctrine "lest it swallow up all competition in the claim of protec-
tion against trade name infringement"); Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'Rith v. Arab Anti-Defamation
League, 340 N.YS.2d 532, 548 n.7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) ("Caution and restraint in [dilution theory's] applica-
tion should be exercised except in special situations involving fanciful and unique marks, lest it be deemed by
Stare decisis effect to establish a Per se rule [of absolute property rights in a trade name]."). Cf Precision
Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) (observing that Patent
Clause constitutes an "exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to access to a free and
open market").
60. See Cue Publ'g Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 256 N.YS.2d 239, 245 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) ("While the right
has been recognized the [dilution] doctrine has been sparingly applied."), affd, 259 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1965); Beverly W Pattishall, The Dilution Rationale for Trademark - Trade Identity Protection, Its
Progress and Prospects, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 607, 610-11 (1977) ("As packaged and presented to date, the con-
cept seemingly has remained so misunderstood or unpalatable to the judicial taste that it largely has been
ignored by the courts despite the plain dictates of the statutes and the voluminous urgings of the academics.");
supra Part I.B.1.
61. See, e.g., Filter Dynamics Int'l, Inc. v. Astron Battery, Inc., 311 N.E.2d 386, 398-99 (III. App. Ct. 1974)
("[W]here the parties are in competition and the plaintiff could not obtain relief under the traditional laws of
infringement and unfair competition, he will not be able to obtain relief under the Anti-Dilution Statute.");
Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162, 1165 (N.Y. 1977) ("New York
courts, State and Federal, have read into the [anti-dilution] statute a requirement of some showing of confusion,
fraud or deception."); id. ("In Illinois ... some courts have gone so far as to declare the statute inapplicable
where the parties are competitors and a likelihood of confusion does exist."); Cue Publ'g, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 245
("It would appear therefore, and the cases have so held, that to give effect to the dilution doctrine some measure
of confusion must be present ...."); Pattishall, supra note 60, at 611 ("Only a few courts during the three
decades of anti-dilution statutes have taken the provisions at their word and applied them without reliance on
the traditional confusion doctrine ... ").
62. See, e.g., Filter Dynamics Int'l, 311 N.E.2d at 398-99; Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co., 139 F
Supp. 228, 233 (D. Mass. 1956) (holding that for dilution to apply, "there must be at least some 'likely confu-
sion,"' despite the language of MAss. GEN. LAwS ch. 110, § 7A to the contrary), vacated on other grounds, 243
F2d 540 (1st Cir. 1957); Allied Maintenance, 369 N.E.2d at 1165 (observing that New York courts require con-
fusion to uphold dilution claim); Cue Publg, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 245 (requiring confusion as element of dilution
claim).
63. Klieger, supra note 35, at 818 (citations omitted); accord Allied Maintenance, 369 N.E.2d at 1165
("Generally, courts which have had the opportunity to interpret an anti-dilution statute have refused to apply its
provisions literally.").
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resistance led one commentator to observe that, under the state anti-dilution
statutes then in existence, there were no findings of "undiluted dilution."'"
As a result, past judicial decisions interpreting state anti-dilution statutes offer
only limited help in deciphering dilution under the federal statute; the decisions
are suspect as either attempts to evade legislative mandates or as indications of
widespread confusion regarding the concept of dilution. Nonetheless, despite the
judicial reluctance actually to find dilution in a given case, these decisions do
contain generalized discussions of the concept that indicate a consensus that
dilution was more or less as Professor Schechter described in 1927.
For example, many courts have adopted the metaphor used by Schechter,
describing dilution as a "gradual whittling away."6" Another court referred to the
effect of dilution as "a cancer-like growth of dissimilar products or services
which feeds upon the business reputation of an established distinctive trade-mark
or name.""' Others have employed alternate descriptions, but the descriptions are
no less in keeping with Schechter's concept. For example, the Supreme Court of
Oregon described dilution as follows:
Where trade[mark] owners have created a favorable association between their
[mark] and their product, they possess a valuable marketing tool. This aura of
recognition enhances the value of [the mark]. Subsequent use of the [mark]
with a nonrelated product broadens the associations linking [the mark] and the
product in the minds of consumers of [the senior user's] product and diminishes
the specific association [the senior user] seeks to foster.6 7
Even where courts have reworked the definition of dilution, it often remains
understandable within Schechter's framework. For example, one court stated that
the purpose of the New York anti-dilution statute was to protect "the selling
power that a distinctive mark or name with favorable associations has engen-
dered for a product in the mind of the consuming public."" This formulation,
despite its different shape, is merely one step removed from Schechter's formula-
tion; at the heart of his conception of dilution was that the unique relationship
between the trademark and the products that the public consumed acted as a sell-
ing agent itself." In other words, the "selling power" of a distinctive mark
64. George E. Middleton, Some Aspects of Trademark Dilution, 47 TRADEMAK REP. 1023, 1026 (1957)
(noting that a finding of dilution invariably followed a finding of likelihood of confusion).
65. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., 855
F.2d 480, 482 (7th Cir. 1988) (observing that the Illinois Anti-Dilution Act "grants protection to trademarks
beyond that provided by the classic 'likelihood of confusion' test under the Laniham Act" and finding that "[tihe
additional protection prevents the gradual whittling away of trademarks' distinctiveness through use by third
parties on non-confusing, non-competing products") (citations omitted); Mortellito v. Nina of Cal., Inc., 335 E
Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("Here we find ... a 'whittling down [of] the identity and reputation of
plaintiffs' names."') (quoting Renofab Process Corp. v. Renotex Corp., 158 N.YS.2d 70, 77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1956)); Lady Esther, Ltd. v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, Inc., 46 N.E.2d 165, 169 (I11. App. Ct. 1943) ("And the
good-will of plaintiff, which it had built up at great expense over a period of years, would be whittled away.").
66. Allied Maintenance Corp., 369 N.E.2d at 1165.
67. Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 659 P.2d 377, 382 (Or. 1983).
68. Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 E2d 621, 624-25 (2d Cir. 1983).
69. Schechter, supra note 38, at 831 ("[T]his selling power [of a trademark] depends for its psychological
hold upon the public .... but equally upon its own uniqueness and singularity."). But see Ringling Bros., 170
F.3d at 456 (stating that "it is clear that none of the original or following statutes purported to enact
[Schechter's] specific form" and noting that the typical formulation under the state antidilution statutes, such as
that examined in Sally Gee, used the formulation of"likelihood of... dilution" (citation omitted)).
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depended upon the uniqueness of the relationship between that mark and the
mark owner's products on which the mark is affixed. 0
Definitions of dilution by commentators even more clearly reaffirm a commit-
ment to Schechter's original conception of the dilution theory as protecting the
unique relationship between a trademark and the products to which it is affixed.
For example, one commentator, critical of the use of dilution within the field of
trademarks, has defined dilution as that which makes the sign "banal," and "lose
its caste."' Another noted the importance of protecting the strength of the
unique mental association between a product and an identifying mark from being
weakened by other mental associations." Still another has described dilution as
the "dispersion of consumers' association of a particular trademark with a partic-
ular product or service.""
In short, despite a strong reluctance to find dilution," most courts, in interpret-
ing state anti-dilution statutes, have espoused varying versions of Schechter's
core concept of dilution-that is, the protection of the unique mental association
between a trademark and the products on which it is affixed against gradual
incursions by a variety of junior users. When the use of another mark may
impinge upon that association, despite the absence of a likelihood of confusion,
protection against dilution will forbid the junior use.
II. THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT
As previously noted, only about one-half of the states had enacted an anti-dilu-
tion statute by 1995.75 Moreover, courts in the states where dilution protection
did exist were reluctant to grant nationwide injunctions against the unauthorized
use of a trademark in the absence of confusion because such use was not unlaw-
ful in one-half of the country.7" This spotty system of protection made it difficult
for trademark owners to preserve the cachet of their mark on a nationwide basis.
To remedy this problem, Congress enacted the Dilution Act to create a nation-
wide, uniform scheme of dilution protection for famous trademarks.77
According to the House Report accompanying the Dilution Act, the Act creat-
ed a "federal cause of action to protect famous marks from unauthorized users
that attempt to trade upon the goodwill and established renown of such marks
and, thereby, dilute their distinctive quality."7 8 Specifically, the Dilution Act enti-
tles the owner of a famous mark "to an injunction against another person's com-
70. Schechter, supra note 38, at 831.
7 1. George E. Middleton, Some Reflections on Dilution, 42 TRADEMAPK REP. 175, 176 (1952).
72. See RESTATEMENT (TmreD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. f (1995) ("In order for such dilution to
occur, prospective purchasers must make a mental connection between the plaintiff's mark and the designation
used by the defendant'").
73. Klieger, supra note 35, at 823.
74. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 4.
76. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3-4 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030-31 ("[Slome courts
are reluctant to grant nationwide injuctions [sic] for violation of state law where half of the states have no dilu-
tion law.").
77. Federal Trademark Dilution Act, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c) (Supp. IV 1998)).
78. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
mercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the
mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the
mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in [the Act].""9
Congress went to great lengths to define the level of fame necessary for a
trademark to qualify for federal protection against dilution. For example, it
included in the Act itself the following eight nonexclusive factors that are rele-
vant to determining whether the plaintiff's mark is sufficiently "distinctive and
famous" to qualify for protection from dilution:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or
services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of
trade used by the mark's owner and the person against whom the injunction
is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties;
and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act
of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register."
Similarly, Congress specified in the accompanying House Report that in order to
qualify for protection, the mark generally "will have been in use for some time"
and the "geographic fame of the mark must extend throughout a substantial por-
tion of the [United States]."8 Congress even provided examples of marks that it
considered sufficiently famous to merit protection-i.e., BUICK, KODAK, and
DUPONT."'
While Congress paid careful attention to the "fame" requirement of the Act, it
did not define the concept of dilution itself in nearly as much detail.83
Nevertheless, some indication of Congress's notion of dilution is discernible
from the language of the Act and its legislative history. Those signals demon-
strate that Congress conceived of dilution in essentially the same manner as
Schechter: erosion of the unique consumer association between a famous trade-
mark and the products to which the trademark owner affixes that mark.'
The Dilution Act defines dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services," regardless of whether there
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
80. Id.
81. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 7 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1034.
82. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
83. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 11 25(c)(Supp. IV 1998)(defining fame), with id. § 1127 (defining dilution).
84. See id. § 1127.
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is competition between the two products at issue or a likelihood of confusion as
to their source."5 The accompanying House Report clarified that "[t]he protec-
tion of marks from dilution differs from the protection accorded marks from
trademark infringement."8 Unlike the traditional trademark infringement
regime, which aims to prevent consumer confusion as to the source of the goods
bearing the mark, the express aim of dilution law specified in the House Report
is to recognize the "substantial investment the owner has made in the mark" and
consequently to protect "the commercial value and aura of the mark itself."87








As the chart shows, dilution, depicted by diagonally descending lines, may
only occur with respect to famous marks. Infringement, by contrast, may occur
with respect to either famous or nonfamous marks, as the diagonally ascending
lines illustrate. Moreover, dilution occurs with respect to all confusing uses of
famous marks (because the mental association necessary for dilution is present),
as the overlapping area between dilution and infringement depicts. Because the
85. Id.
86. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030; accord I.P. Lund
Trading ApS v. Kohler, 163 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 1998) (recognizing that distinctions between trademark
infringement and dilution laws are "particularly pertinent" to whether "dilution protection of trade dress of
product design amounts to an unconstitutional perpetual monopoly under the Patent Clause of the
Constitution"); Stephen K. Marsh, Patents Are Forever: Construing the Federal Trademark Dilution Act To
Apply To Product Configurations in Sunbeam Products., Inc. v. The West Bend. Co., 4. J. INTELL. PROP. L. 421,
424 (1997) ("The dilution doctrine differs fundamentally from the doctrines of trademark and trade dress pro-
tection.").
87. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030; accord 4 MCCARTHY, supra
note 32, § 24:90 ("While traditional trademark law rests primarily on a policy of protection of customers from
mistake and deception, anti-dilution law more closely resembles an absolute property right in a trademark.").
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Act expressly refuses to limit dilution to confusing uses of a mark, however, dilu-
tion may occur with respect to nonconfusing uses of a famous mark as well, as
shown by the non-overlapping region of the diagonally descending lines.
Perhaps the most enlightening statement in the accompanying House Report
concerning the nature of dilution is Congress's statement that dilution exists
whenever "the unauthorized use of a famous mark reduces the public's percep-
tion that the mark signifies something unique, singular, or particular."88 As self-
explanatory examples of this phenomenon, Congress stated that "the use of
DUPONT shoes, BUICK aspirin, and KODAK pianos would be actionable under
this legislation."89 In citing to these examples of dilution by blurring, Congress
acknowledged that dilution, at its core, occurs "where the same or very similar
marks are being used on vastly different products, [thus creating] 'the risk of an
erosion of the public's identification of [a] very strong mark"' with the mark's
owner and his or her product line alone." Nevertheless, Congress did not con-
fine dilution to these typical scenarios, but rather extended that concept to
encompass any unauthorized use of a famous mark on either noncompeting or
competing goods."
In short, Congress intended dilution to encompass all unauthorized uses of a
famous mark and variants so similar that consumers would associate the similar
junior mark with the famous mark. Moreover, whether the products bearing the
marks competed with each other was irrelevant, as was whether consumers were
confused about the source of the product bearing the junior mark.92 Any unau-
thorized use-regardless of competition and confusion-will reduce the capacity
of the famous mark to distinguish goods and to signify "something unique, sin-
gular, or particular."93 Dilution will result as consumers who once associated the
famous mark only with products originating from the famous mark owner begin
to associate the famous mark with the products originating from the unautho-
rized user as well. To prevent this harm from occurring, Congress intended that
the unauthorized use of a junior mark that is identical or substantially similar to a
famous mark, without more, would trigger the dilution protection provided by
the federal Act.
The examples of dilution cited by Congress confirm Congress's intent to apply
the Act broadly, once a mark has been shown to be famous. For example,
Congress's reference to KODAK pianos as a per se example of dilution shows
that Congress intended to grant the owner of the famous KODAK mark the
exclusive right to use KODAK on its goods and to prevent any and all unautho-
rized uses of that mark on pianos or any other product. Moreover, Congress's
decision to provide a multi-factored analysis for determining fame, but no con-
comitant test for determining dilution, further indicates that Congress intended a
88. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
89. Id., reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
90. Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48, 56 (D.N.M. 1985) (quoting Tiffany & Co. v.
Boston Club, Inc., 231 F Supp. 836, 844 (D. Mass. 1964), affd, 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987)).
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. IV 1998).
92. See id.
93. H.R. Rae. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
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straightforward, Schechterian concept of dilution-i.e., nothing need be tested
but the uniqueness of the connection between the mark and the goods to which
the mark is affixed. Under such a test, there are very few factors to consider.
Either the junior mark is sufficiently similar to the famous mark as to evoke a
consumer mental association between the two marks, or it is not.
Despite judicial confusion concerning the dilution doctrine and a reluctance to
apply it faithfully, an examination of actual case results nevertheless reveals that
the similarity of the marks at issue is often the key determining factor, regardless
of the professed test applied. Specifically, dilution of a famous or well-known
mark often is found from the use of an identical or substantially similar junior
mark."' Conversely, even where the senior mark is famous or well-known, dilu-
tion is not normally found if the junior mark is not identical or substantially simi-
lar to the senior mark.
95
Analysis of this scheme reveals that not only is it eminently logical, but it
effectively guards against converting the trademark laws into monopolistic
restrictions on language and swallowing up traditional trademark protection,
94. See, e.g., Nikon, Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 987 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding dilution under New York
statute where Nikon mark was well-known and defendant's mark was similar); Ringling Bros., 855 F2d at 482-
83 (finding dilution by blurring under Illinois statute where plaintiff's "Greatest Show On Earth" slogan was
famous and defendant's "Greatest Used Car Show On Earth" slogan in bold, red, circus-style lettering was sirni-
lar); Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545, 1552-53 (S.D. Miss. 1996) (granting prelimi-
nary injunction under federal Act for both infringement and dilution where plaintiff's blender design was
famous and defendant's blender was "almost identical in shape, size and appearance"), aff'd on other grounds,
123 F3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1118 (1998); Clinique Labs., Inc. v. Dep Corp., 945 F.
Supp. 547, 562-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding dilution by blurring under Federal Trademark Dilution Act where
Clinique's mark and trade dress were renowned and defendant's mark and trade dress were similar); Stem's
Miracle-Gro Prods., Inc. v. Shark Prods., Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1077, 1090-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding dilution by
blurring under New York statute where plaintiff's mark was widely known and defendant's mark was "virtually
identical"); American Express Co. v. American Express Limousine Serv., Ltd., 772 F. Supp. 729, 736 (E.D.N.Y
1991) (finding dilution by blurring under New York statute where plaintiff's mark was strong and defendants
incorporated "American Express" in their name); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Rakow, 739 F Supp. 116, 118-20
(W.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding dilution by blurring under New York statute where "Kodak" mark was "truly distinc-
tive" and defendant used the "Kodak" name); 7iffany & Co., 231 F. Supp. at 842-43 (finding dilution by blur-
ring under Massachusetts statute because Tiffany was a widely known name and defendant used "Tiffany's" as
its restaurant name).
95. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F2d 1026, 1034-37 (2d Cir.
1989) (finding no dilution under New York statute where "Lexis" was only well-known in narrow market of
attorneys and accountants and "Lexus" and "Lexis" were not "very" or "substantially" similar); Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding no dilution under New York statute
where "King Kong" mark was well-known but "Donkey Kong" was "so different that no reasonable question of
fact was raised on the issue of blurring"); Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d
1201, 1210 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding no dilution by blurring under Massachusetts statute where plaintiff's mark
was well-known in its field but marks were dissimilar); Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 246-48 (2d Cir.
1983) (finding no dilution by blurring under New York statute where Superman character was well-known but
defendants' accused superhero character was not substantially similar); Clinique Labs., 945 F. Supp. at 563
(finding no dilution by blurring under federal Act where "Clinique" mark was famous but defendant's "Basique
simplified skin care" marks, without the trade dress, were dissimilar); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F Supp. 204, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding no dilution by
blurring under federal Act or New York statute where plaintiff's slogan was famous but "The Greatest Bar On
Earth" was not sufficiently similar); Black Dog Tavern Co. v. Hall, 823 F. Supp. 48, 55-59 (D. Mass. 1993)
(finding no dilution by blurring under Massachusetts statute where plaintiff's Black Dog mark was strong and
distinctive but defendant's mark was not similar).
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW RE VIEW [VOL. 20:245
long-standing concerns of courts and commentators alike. 6 Congress's scrupu-
lous attention to the fame requirement and the rigor with which it intends the
requirement to be enforced ensures that only a tiny fraction of all trademarks will
qualify for protection from dilution. Indeed, Congress's statement that only well-
established marks with substantially nationwide fame should generally qualify
for dilution protection97 as well as its examples of eligible trademarks-KODAK,
BUICK, and DUPONT-demonstrate that Congress intended the Act to cover
only trademarks that are essentially household names.
Once over the rigorous "fame" hurdle, however, Congress intended the famous
mark owner to have the exclusive right to prevent all unauthorized uses of its
trademark and sufficiently similar variants thereof, much like the monopolistic
rights enjoyed by the owner of a patent or a copyright.9 8 This two-tiered
scheme-with the "fame" requirement ensuring sufficient consumer recognition
of the protected mark and the "similarity" requirement ensuring that consumers
will make the requisite mental association between the junior mark and the
famous mark-provided for a seemingly straightforward dilution inquiry.
In sum, the intent of Congress in enacting the Dilution Act appears to have
been to provide trademark owners with protection of the unique and immediate
consumer mental association between their mark and their products to which that
mark is affixed.
III. THE SWEET FACTORS: EARLY DILUTION ANALYSIS UNDER THE FEDERAL ACT
The streamlining of the dilution inquiry accomplished by the federal Dilution
Act is perhaps best appreciated by contrasting the Act with the predominant dilu-
tion test employed by courts prior to the Act's passage: Judge Sweet's balancing
test popularized in his concurring opinion in Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.9" That test requires courts to examine the following six
factors to determine whether each of them points toward or against dilution
96. See, e.g., 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 32, § 24:100 ("Many judges view [dilution theory] with distaste
because they see a plaintiff who uses the dilution theory as asking for too much of a zone of exclusivity for the
trademark."); Welkowitz, supra note 20, at 536, 546 & n.82 ("Courts have expressed reservations that a strin-
gent application of antidilution statutes would swallow up much of the law of trademark and unfair competition
and would foster unwanted monopolies."); Note, supra note 21, at 522 (referring to "impoverishment of the
available supply of marks"); supra note 59 and accompanying text.
97. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 7 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1034.
98. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994) (granting patentee "the right to exclude others from making, using, offering
for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States"); 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) (granting "owner of
copyright... the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following" acts, including the right to repro-
duce, distribute, and publicly perform or display the copyrighted work); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,
376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) ("The grant of a patent is the grant of a statutory monopoly... "').
99. 875 F2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J., concurring). Even after the passage of the Act, many courts
continue to apply this test. See, e.g., Conopco, Inc. v. Cosmair, Inc., 49 E Supp. 2d 242, 258 n.23 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (holding that likelihood of dilution is determined by application of the Sweet factors); Hershey Foods
Corp. v. Mars, Inc., 998 F Supp. 500, 504 (M.D. Pa. 1998) ("In deciding whether the defendant's mark dilutes
the plaintiff's by blurring, federal courts interpreting § 1125(c) have started from the framework first set forth
in Judge Sweet's concurring opinion in [Mead Data], which Judge Sweet used for interpreting the New York
antidilution statute."); Star Mkts., Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 950 F Supp. 1030, 1035 (D. Haw. 1996) (holding that
test for dilution under the Dilution Act is the Sweet test); American Express Co. v. CFK, Inc., 947 F Supp. 310,
316-17 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (characterizing the Sweet test as useful for determining dilution under the Dilution
Act); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204, 211
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying the Sweet test).
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under the facts of the given case: "(1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the simi-
larity of the products covered by the marks; (3) the sophistication of the con-
sumers; (4) predatory intent; (5) renown of the senior mark; and (6) renown of
the junior mark."1" According to Judge Sweet, "the more similar the marks the
higher the likelihood of dilution," presumably because dilution requires at least
some degree of consumer mental association between the two marks at issue. 0 1
Product similarity also supports a dilution finding under this test because a
mark's selling power, which anti-dilution statutes aimed to protect, is at greatest
risk from competing products. 0 2 Consumer sophistication, by contrast, cuts
against a dilution finding under Judge Sweet's analysis because sophisticated
consumers are less likely to allow the use of a similar junior mark to "blur the
senior mark's selling power." ' Predatory intent of the junior user enhances the
likelihood of dilution because it evidences a belief of the junior user that "it can
benefit commercially from copying the senior user's trademark,' thereby harm-
ing the senior mark's selling power."0 4 Finally, renown of both the senior and the
junior marks points toward a dilution finding because such renown increases the
likelihood that consumers will make the requisite mental association between the
two marks.0 ' According to Judge Sweet, a court must then balance these factors
to determine whether they support a finding of dilution.0 8
Despite the Sweet test's initial popularity, the factors offered are, on the whole,
inappropriate for determining dilution, particularly in light of the analytical
framework that Congress established in the Dilution Act. For example, the
"product similarity" factor aims to measure the degree of competition between
the two products to determine whether the junior mark user's product lessens the
selling power of the senior mark holder's product-the greater the competition
between the two products, the more likely dilution becomes, according to Judge
Sweet. Yet this analysis contravenes the core concept of dilution, which initially
aimed to prevent the use of a distinctive senior mark on unrelated goods and ser-
vices and only later was expanded to apply to the unauthorized use of a mark on
competing goods and/or services." 7 Moreover, Congress has expressly rendered
the degree of competition between the products at issue irrelevant to the dilution
analysis by declaring that dilution may exist "regardless of the presence or
absence of... competition between the owner of the famous mark and other par-
ties.""a Indeed, the paradigmatic examples of dilution proffered by Congress-
KODAK pianos, BUICK aspirin, and DUPONT shoes, all of which constitute
100. Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1035.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 1036.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1037.
105. See id. at 1038-39.
106. See id. at 1039-40.
107. See IP. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F3d 27, 45 (lst Cir. 1998) (noting that "the archetypal
[dilution) problems involved non-competing products:' but that "[tjhe language of the FTDA itself is, however,
not limited to addressing these archetypal problems"); Nikon, Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 987 F2d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1993)
(holding that the New York anti-dilution statute applies to competitors as well as non-competitors).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. TV 1998).
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use of a famous mark on noncompeting, dissimilar products-also refute the use
of this factor in any dilution analysis. In light of Congress's unequivocal intent
that the Act apply as much, if not more, to unauthorized mark uses on noncom-
peting products as opposed to competing products, it is inappropriate for courts
to consider the similarity of the products at issue in determining dilution under
the Dilution Act.
Likewise, consumer sophistication, while highly relevant to whether con-
sumers will be confused over the source of a product bearing an unauthorized
junior mark," 9 has very little to do with dilution. As defined by the Dilution Act,
dilution signifies "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services.""11 This phenomenon can occur with respect to
either less sophisticated or more sophisticated consumers. Less sophisticated
consumers viewing a product that bears a junior trademark that is identical or
substantially similar to the senior mark are more likely to believe mistakenly that
the goods emanate from, or are sponsored by, the senior mark holder. For these
confused consumers, this unauthorized use has diluted the unique mental associ-
ation between the senior mark and the mark owner's goods because the mark now
appears on goods and/or services other than those originating from the senior
mark holder. It does not matter that consumers may mistakenly associate both
uses of the mark with a single source (the senior owner)-all that matters is that
the strength of the mental link between the mark and the senior owner's products
has been diminished by the mark's use on other products not associated with the
senior owner.
Dilution can also occur with respect to more sophisticated consumers.
Sophisticated consumers viewing a product that bears a junior trademark that is
identical or substantially similar to a senior mark may notice the similarity or
identity of the two marks yet correctly recognize that the junior and senior mark
holders are independent companies and that the junior mark holder's goods there-
fore do not originate from the senior mark holder. Nevertheless, those con-
sumers, even though they correctly distinguish between the two companies and
their products, still will associate the senior mark itself with not only the senior
mark holder's goods and services, but the junior mark holder's products as
well."' This more diffuse mark association (despite correct company recogni-
tion) will diminish the ability of the senior mark to identify and distinguish those
goods and services marketed solely by the senior mark holder.
109. See Pignons S.A. de Mechanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F2d 482, 489 (1st Cir. 1981) (not-
ing that sophistication of consumers is relevant to determinations of likelihood of confusion because "[s]ophis-
ticated consumers may be expected to exercise greater care"); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 E2d 341, 353
(9th Cir. 1979) (noting that consumer sophistication is relevant to likelihood of confusion analysis); Polaroid
Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 E2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (holding that sophistication of the buyers is a
factor to consider when determining likelihood of confusion).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. IV 1998).
Ill. Consider, for example, the unauthorized use of the KODAK trademark on televisions. Unsophisticated
consumers may believe mistakenly that Eastman Kodak is marketing the televisions, and dilution occurs
because the ability of the KODAK trademark to signify a certain type of camera has been lessened through the
use of the mark on televisions and consumers' mistaken association of that mark with Eastman Kodak.
Sophisticated consumers, by contrast, may recognize that an independent company is marketing the televisions
bearing the KODAK mark. Nevertheless, they now will associate KODAK with televisions in addition to cam-
eras, thus lessening the ability of the KODAK mark to identify the cameras marketed by Eastman Kodak.
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Simply put, it is the mental connection that consumers make between the unau-
thorized junior mark and the senior mark holder, not the consumers' belief as to
the source of the goods bearing the unauthorized mark, that determines whether
dilution is occurring. Thus, the degree of consumer sophistication, which mea-
sures consumer source confusion, is irrelevant to the dilution analysis." 2
Predatory intent is similarly unimportant in determining whether a junior user
has subverted the uniqueness of the senior mark. As demonstrated above, that
inquiry hinges upon the state of mind of consumers viewing the junior product,
not on the state of mind of the junior mark holder in using the mark."3 The only
effect of a plaintiff's demonstration of predatory intent under the Dilution Act is
to allow the plaintiff to recover monetary damages in addition to the standard
injunctive relief."1 4 Thus, Judge Sweet's characterization of predatory intent as
relevant to the dilution analysis is suspect.
The renown of the junior user's mark is also irrelevant to a determination of
dilution. The concept of dilution is based upon the general "whittling away" of
the capacity of a senior mark to identify the products of the mark holder. Greater
renown of a junior mark merely increases the rate of this whittling away. Yet
"[n]o matter how small the dilution, the harm has been done.... Just one whit-
tle taken from a stick destroys the possibility that the stick can ever be made
whole.""'  Thus, a lesser known mark still dilutes the uniqueness of the famous
senior mark, only at a slower rate. It is unlikely that Congress intended a
"renown floor" for the junior mark under which insubstantial, diluting uses of a
mark, if sufficiently obscure, could not be prohibited."'
The two remaining factors set forth by Judge Sweet-renown of the senior
mark and the similarity of the marks-are, in fact, relevant to the dilution
inquiry. Under the Dilution Act, however, renown of the senior mark is treated as
a threshold eligibility determination for protection from dilution." 7 Once the
threshold has been satisfied, renown of the senior mark has no more bearing on
the actual dilution analysis. Thus, the only factor from the Sweet test that is rele-
vant to a determination of dilution under the federal Act is the degree of similari-
ty between the junior and senior marks. With the exception of the fame factor,
the remaining Sweet factors are imported from the likelihood of confusion test
112. This conclusion is borne out by the Dilution Act, which expressly renders consumer source confusion
irrelevant to the dilution inquiry. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. IV 1998).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 109-12; 4 McCARTHY, supra note 32, § 24.94.2 ("The predatory
intent of factor (4) has little predictive power as to the likelihood of blurring, which occurs in customers' minds
regardless of the junior user's intent.").
114. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1998) (allowing monetary and other damages provided for by the
Lanham Act to be awarded where plaintiff demonstrates that defendant "willfully intended to trade on the
owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark").
115. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F Supp. 204, 209
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
116. Notably, Congress made no reference in the Dilution Act to a balancing of the relative strength of the
competing marks in determining dilution.
117. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1998) (providing relief to famous mark owner "against another
person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become
famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark").
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and adopted with little careful thought into their applicability in the dilution con-
text. " 8
IV DEFINING DILUTION UNDER THE FEDERAL ACT: STRUGGLE IN THE CIRCUITS
Following Congress's enactment of the Dilution Act, which establishes a differ-
ent analytical framework than that supported by Judge Sweet's test, courts have
increasingly rejected the Sweet factors as an appropriate analytical tool for deter-
mining dilution. In particular, the three circuit courts of appeals that have ana-
lyzed the Dilution Act all have declined to apply the Sweet factors in reaching
their dilution determination.
The appropriate substitute for the Sweet test, however, remains very much
open to debate. Of the three federal appellate courts rejecting the Sweet factors,
as many replacement tests have emerged, each differing substantially from the
other two. Analysis of the three tests reveals that only one court-the First
Circuit-has devised a test that adheres to Congress's concept of dilution as
expressed in the Dilution Act. The other courts-the Fourth Circuit and the
Second Circuit-have improperly imported additional considerations in analyz-
ing dilution that Congress arguably never intended.
A. The Fourth Circuit's Economic Harm Test In Ringling Brothers
In Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows Inc. v. Utah Division of
Travel Development,11 the plaintiff asked the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit to reverse a lower court decision that the Utah Division of
Travel's mark, "The Greatest Snow on Earth," did not dilute its mark "The
Greatest Show on Earth." ' In support of its request, Ringling relied on survey
results based upon consumer perceptions concerning the statement "The Greatest
__ on Earth," both within and outside of Utah. While 41% of those surveyed
outside of Utah associated that statement exclusively with Ringling's mark, only
25% within Utah found such a unique association. 2 ' Moreover, fewer than 0.5%
outside of Utah associated the statement with both Ringling's and Utah's mark,
while 21% within Utah associated the statement with both marks. 22 Finally, 0%
outside of Utah associated the statement exclusively with Utah's mark, whereas
24% within Utah connected the statement only to Utah's mark.'23 Such evidence
shows that a substantial proportion of consumers who are exposed to Utah's
junior mark no longer associate "The Greatest _ on Earth" exclusively with
Ringling's mark. Rather, many associate the statement with both Ringling's and
Utah's mark, and some even associate the statement with Utah's mark alone.
I IS. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 32, § 24.94.2 (asserting that Sweet "factors are the offspring of classical
likelihood of confusion analysis and are not particularly relevant or helpful in resolving the issues of dilution by
blurring").
119. 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 120 S. Ct. 286 (1999).
120. Id. at 452.
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Thus, Ringling appears to have made precisely the type of showing necessary to
substantiate a dilution claim under the federal Dilution Act.
The Fourth Circuit, however, rejected Ringling's claim based on its own con-
cept of dilution."' After determining that the oft-used Sweet test was inappropri-
ate for determining dilution claims, the court enunciated a different test: "the
federal Act requires proof that (1) [the] defendant has made use of a junior mark
sufficiently similar to the famous mark to evoke in a relevant universe of con-
sumers a mental association of the two that (2) has caused (3) actual economic
harm.,'
25
Although the court recognized that such a standard was "a stringent interpreta-
tion of 'dilution' under the federal Act," 1 the court identified two key features of
the Act that supported its interpretation. First, the court noted that the Act did
not proscribe a mere "likelihood of dilution," language that often appeared in
state dilution statutes.127 From this omission, the court concluded that the
Dilution Act required actual dilution to trigger its protection. '28 Second, the court
relied upon the definition of dilution under the Act: "[B]y specifically defining
dilution as 'the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distin-
guish goods and services,' the federal Act makes plain what the state statutes
arguably may not: that the end harm at which it is aimed is a mark's selling
power, not its 'distinctiveness' as such." 129  From these two points, the court
extracted requirements that the plaintiff in any Dilution Act proceeding demon-
strate that (1) the selling power of its mark had decreased, and (2) the defendant's
use of its mark had caused that decrease. 130
The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the Dilution Act flies in the face of
Congress's understanding of dilution. In its opinion, the Fourth Circuit expressly
rejected a dilution test based solely on the degree of similarity between the two
marks at issue (i.e., the first prong of its three-part test), holding that "we simply
cannot believe that, as a general proposition, Congress could have intended,
without making its intention to do so perfectly clear, to create property rights in
gross, unlimited in time (via injunction), even in 'famous' trademarks."'31 Such a
test would have implemented Schechter's original concept of dilution as protect-
ing the value of a mark's "uniqueness" as such without further demonstration of
124. See id. at 462-63.
125. Id. at 461.
126. Id. at 458. In reaching this "stringent interpretation" of the Act, the Fourth Circuit extensively relied
upon state dilution cases as establishing that dilution has always been addressed to the lessening of sales power.
See id. ("[A] general agreement has emerged that 'dilution' under the state statutes involves as an essential ele-
ment some form of harm to the protected mark's selling power-its economic value-resulting otherwise than
by consumer confusion from the junior mark's use."). Such heavy reliance, however, is suspect in light of the
unremitting hostility toward the concept of dilution evidenced by those courts. See supra notes 57-64 and
accompanying text.
127. Ringling Bros., 170 F3d at 458.
128. See id.
129. Id. (citation omitted).
130. See id.
131. Id. at 459; see also id. at 457-48 ("As is obvious, by requiring no proof of 'likely' dilution of a senior
mark but the identity or sufficient similarity of a junior mark, this approach effectively interprets the state
statutes as creating property rights in gross in the senior mark.").
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economic harm,"' a concept that the court deemed too radical for Congress to
have intended."' Yet in reaching this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit ignored por-
tions of the Act and its legislative history which reveal that that is precisely what
Congress envisioned the Dilution Act to accomplish.
First, Congress explicitly characterized dilution as the loss of a mark's unique-
ness as such. As the House Report explains, dilution "applies when the unautho-
rized use of a famous mark reduces the public's perception that the mark signi-
fies something unique, singular, or particular."13' The definition of dilution
found in the Act itself-"the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to iden-
tify and distinguish goods or services" 135- likewise confirms Congress's percep-
tion of dilution as the diminution of a mark's uniqueness. The capacity of a
famous mark to distinguish goods will always be lessened by the use of an iden-
tical-or sufficiently similar-junior mark on other products because the famous
mark will now be associated with more products than it had been prior to the use
of the junior mark. In other words, no additional showing of economic harm is
necessary to satisfy Congress's definition of dilution, which is met upon proof of
an unauthorized use or substantial replication of a famous mark.
Second, Congress recognized that proof of economic harm is neither required
nor feasible to establish dilution because unlike trademark infringement, dilution
does not lead to immediate economic injury. Rather, the harm arising from dilu-
tion is more insidious and undetectable in its early stages: "'Dilution is an injury
that differs materially from that arising out of the orthodox confusion ....
Confusion leads to immediate injury, while dilution is an infection which, if
allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark."' 136
Only after irreparable damage had occurred would the harm be discernible.
Thus, requiring proof of economic harm perversely would render the Dilution
Act inoperable until precisely the type of harm that Congress intended to prevent
had already occurred.
Third, Congress perceived dilution as a prospective harm that should be pre-
vented at the outset rather than a completed harm for which the famous mark
owner should receive compensation. To forestall dilution before it irreparably
eroded the distinctiveness of a famous mark, Congress provided injunctive relief
as the exclusive remedy for dilution in the absence of willfulness on the part of
the accused junior user.13' The fact that Congress provided prospective relief and
132. See id. at 456 ("As proposed by Schechter, the interest was easily identified as simply the mark's
'uniqueness'. . .and the harm, as a loss of that uniqueness.").
133. See id. at 454 ("This radical dilution proposal, whose practical effect if fully adopted would be to create
as the whole of trademark-protection law property rights in gross in suitably 'unique' marks, never has been
legislatively adopted by any jurisdiction in anything approaching that extreme form.").
134. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. IV 1998).
136. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030 (quoting Mortellito v. Nina of
Cal., Inc., 335 E Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (emphasis added)).
137. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1998) ("In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of
the famous mark shall be entitled only to injunctive relief unless the person against whom the injunction is
sought willfully intended to trade on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark.").
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expressly excluded retrospective relief as a remedy for dilution in most cases fur-
ther demonstrates the nonsensical nature of importing an economic harm
requirement into the Act.
Finally, and of most practical importance, the Fourth Circuit's economic harm
test eviscerates the Act by rendering it virtually impossible for any owner of a
famous mark ever to establish dilution.'38 As the court itself noted, "'marks can
lose their distinctiveness or power to identify goods and services for various rea-
sons other than the use of a junior mark,"' which would make the causation
requirement of the court's test difficult to meet.'" Moreover, courts have long
recognized that the harm that results from dilution is extraordinarily difficult to
establish."se
Ironically, it would be most difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy the Fourth
Circuit's test with respect to precisely those cases to which Congress most
unequivocally intended the Dilution Act to apply-i.e., the unauthorized use or
substantial replication of a famous mark on dissimilar products or services. For
example, despite Congress's clear intent to prohibit the sale of KODAK pianos
pursuant to the Act,"' it would be extraordinarily difficult for Eastman Kodak to
establish that the sale of KODAK pianos somehow harmed its camera sales, as
pianos are noncompeting and wholly dissimilar products in relation to cam-
eras.
14 2
In short, the Fourth Circuit's three-part test is inconsistent with congressional
intent and unworkable. 4  Although the first prong-i.e., sufficient similarity
between the famous and junior marks to evoke a consumer mental association
between the two-properly reflects Congress's concept of dilution, the latter two
prongs-causation and actual economic harm--eviscerate the Act. Indeed, the
138. See Klieger, supra note 35, at 840 ("Of course, Congress did not intend to require, nor do courts inter-
pret the Act to require, a showing of actual dilution.").
139. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 460
(4th Cir.) (quoting District Court opinion, 955 F Supp. 605, 615 (E.D. Va. 1997)), cert.denied, 120 S. Ct. 286
(1999).
140. See, e.g., Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 736 E2d 1153, 1158 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that "it is the
very nature of dilution to gnaw away insidiously at the value of a mark" and that "[sluch an injury would be
remarkably difficult to convert into damages"). For that reason, courts faced with a preliminary injunction
motion based on trademark dilution presume that the famous mark owner will be irreparably harmed from the
unauthorized junior use of its mark. See, e.g., American Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F.
Supp. 2d 727, 729 (D. Minn. 1998) ("For trademark dilution, proof of a likelihood of dilution of a mark will
support a presumption of irreparable harm."); Hyatt Corp. v. Club Regency Int'l, No. 85 C 7540, 1986 WL
8029, at *3 (ND. Ill. July 14, 1986) ("In infringement-unfair competition and dilution claims, irreparable harm
to the plaintiff's presumed, because the injury complained of is the kind for which pecuniary damages cannot
be easily calculated.").
141. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030 (stating that the sale
of "KODAK pianos would be actionable under this legislation").
142. In response to Ringling's identification of this conundrum, the Fourth Circuit unsatisfactorily responded
that it would "express no view on the significance of this excerpt from legislative history in that circumstance."
Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 459 n.5. It then attempted to distinguish those cases from the instant case by noting
that the congressional statement "speaks directly only to the effect of an identical replication which is not
involved in this case." Id. (emphasis added). If the Fourth Circuit's test is to have any logical coherence at all,
at a minimum it must apply to the cases identified by Congress as meriting protection under the Act.
143. On October 4, 1999, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Ringling Bros. See 120 S. Ct. 286 (1999).
Although the Supreme Court likely will resolve the conflict in the circuits concerning the appropriate dilution
test at some time or another, denial of certiorari in this instance was advisable in light of the Court's ruling ear-
lier in 1999 that states are immune from suit under the Lanham Act absent a waiver of such immunity. See
College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
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Second Circuit, which analyzed the Dilution Act on the heels of the Fourth
Circuit's opinion, expressly rejected the Fourth Circuit's test for dilution."" As
demonstrated below, however, the Second Circuit's consideration of the Act,
which followed neither the Fourth Circuit's nor Judge Sweet's test,"' only inject-
ed further judicial confusion concerning the appropriate analytical framework for
determining dilution.
B. The Second Circuit s Open-Ended Test In Nabisco
In Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.,'", the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reviewed the district court's determination that "Nabisco's use
of an orange, bite-sized, cheddar cheese-flavored, goldfish-shaped cracker...
would dilute the distinctive quality of Pepperidge Farm's mark consisting of an
orange, bite-sized, cheddar cheese-flavored, goldfish-shaped cracker, in violation
of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act."'4 7 In examining whether Nabisco's use
of a goldfish-shaped cracker diluted Pepperidge Farm's trade dress in that same
shape and color of cracker, the court rejected all prior judicial tests for dilution,
opting instead to devise its own test, which consisted of an open-ended analysis
of "the factors that appear[ed] pertinent on these particular facts.""' Those fac-
tors were:
(a) the degree of distinctiveness of the mark;
(b) the similarity of the marks;
(c) the proximity of the products and the likelihood of bridging the gap;
(d) the interrelationship among the distinctiveness of the senior mark,
the similarity of the junior mark, and the proximity of the products;
(e) shared consumers and geographic limitations;
(f) consumer sophistication;
(g) actual confusion;
(h) adjectival or referential quality of the junior use;
(i) harm to the junior user and delay by the senior user; and
(j) effect of the senior mark holder's prior laxity in protecting the mark. " 9
The court opted for an open-ended test because it believed that it was better not
to limit the important factors that courts consider when they interpret and apply
the Dilution Act.'1° While this may be a good general principle to follow when
approaching novel statutes with little interpretive guidance, an examination of
144. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 223-24 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that "[t]o require
proof of actual loss of revenue seems inappropriate" and that "[t]o read the statute as suggested by the Ringling
opinion would subject the senior user to uncompensable injury").
145. Ironically, Judge Sweet's test originated from a concurrence in one of the Second Circuit's own opinions.
See supra note 12.
146. 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
147. Id. at 212.
148. Id. at 217.
149. See id. at 217-22.
150. See id. at 227.
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the ten factors that the Second Circuit applied in this case reveals that the court
has improperly included a number of factors that have no bearing on the dilution
analysis itself. That analysis is a straightforward inquiry measuring the effect of
an identical or substantially similar junior mark on the uniqueness and strength
of the link between a famous mark and the goods and services to which it is
affixed.. Disregarding this straightforward inquiry, the Second Circuit has erro-
neously folded into the dilution analysis considerations regarding (1) fame,
which already has a separate place within the framework of the Dilution Act, (2)
consumer source confusion, which, by Congress's express directive, is not rele-
vant to a dilution analysis under the federal Act,"s' and (3) fair use and estoppel
by laches, which are affirmative defenses to dilution.
1. Fame
With respect to the "degree of distinctiveness" factor, for example, the Nabisco
court held that this factor "plays a dual role" in that it is relevant not only to the
distinctiveness requirement of the Dilution Act but also to the dilution inquiry
itself because "the more distinctiveness the mark possesses, the greater the inter-
est to be protected."' 2 In so holding, the court engaged in inappropriate double-
counting of this factor and ignored the explicit analytical structure that Congress
established in the Dilution Act. As a prerequisite to obtaining any protection
from dilution, a mark must first be found to be "distinctive and famous."' 3
Congress set forth a nonexclusive list of factors to be considered in determining
whether the mark met that demanding standard; the first of these factors was "the
degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark."'5 " In other words, the
degree of distinctiveness of a mark is highly relevant to whether the mark should
receive dilution protection at all and serves to weed out those marks that do not
possess that requisite level of distinctiveness. Once that stringent threshold is
met, however, it is inappropriate to consider a mark's distinctiveness as a factor
informing the dilution analysis, as the determination has already been made that
the mark is distinctive enough to merit protection.
The "shared consumers and geographic limitations"'' s factor that the Second
Circuit relied upon also is more appropriately considered as part of the fame
analysis mandated by the federal Act. The court held that fewer shared con-
sumers and greater geographic limitations of the mark signified a lower likeli-
hood of dilution because "[i]f consumers who buy the products of the senior user
never see the junior user's products or publicity, then those consumers will con-
tinue to perceive the senior user's mark as unique, notwithstanding the junior
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. IV 1998) (defining dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark
to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of... [the] likelihood of
confusion, mistake, or deception").
152. Nabisco, 191 F3dat 217.
153. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
154. Id.
155. Nabisco, 191 F 3d at 220.
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use."'"" Again, however, this factor has more to do with consumer recognition of
the senior mark among those exposed to the junior mark, a concern that
Congress already addressed in the fame inquiry of the Dilution Act."'
Carried to its logical conclusion, the Second Circuit's inclusion of the "shared
consumers and geographic limitations" factor in its test for dilution would mean
that a mark with sufficient nationwide renown to meet the rigorous fame require-
ment yet without sufficient geographic fame in the junior user's limited territory
to satisfy this factor would fail to qualify for dilution protection, all other factors
being neutral. This is a counterintuitive result. Moreover, if these two marks
eventually did risk encountering each other geographically, courts would face a
conundrum. Should the senior mark maintain a geographic zone of dilution lim-
ited to the area where it had achieved fame, into which the junior cannot pro-
ceed?sa This outcome would appear to contravene Congress's intent to protect
marks that had achieved substantially nationwide fame, on a nationwide basis.5 9
Yet, if courts give the senior user nationwide priority at this later juncture, the
equity concerns with halting the junior use of the mark altogether, which may
have been minimal when the junior use was first challenged, likely will have
grown with the passage of time and the reliance of the junior user."W
In short, the Second Circuit's inclusion of the "degree of distinctiveness" and
"shared consumers and geographic limitations" factors in its dilution test is inap-
propriate. While both of these factors are highly informative of the fame inquiry,
neither should play any further role in determining dilution claims once a mark
has met the stringent fame threshold established by the Dilution Act.
2. Confusion
Just as the Second Circuit improperly double-counted factors that are consid-
ered separately under the Dilution Act, so, too, did it erroneously import fac-
tors-i.e., the proximity of the products and likelihood of bridging the gap, the
evidence of actual confusion, and the sophistication of consumers-that are rem-
nants of a likelihood of confusion analysis in trademark infringement actions, but
have no place in a dilution inquiry under the federal Act. With respect to the
"proximity of the products and likelihood of bridging the gap" factor, for exam-
ple, the court held that "[tihe closer the junior user comes to the senior's area of
156. Id.
157. Indeed, Congress explicitly listed "the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used"
and "the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the marks' owner
and the person against whom the injunction is sought" as relevant factors to the fame analysis. 15 U.S.C.
§ I 25(c)(I)(D), (F) (Supp. IV 1998).
158. Cf Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959). In Dawn Donut, the Second
Circuit refused to grant injunctive relief for trademark infringement to the owner of a federally registered trade-
mark because the owner of that mark did not use that mark, nor seemed likely to use that mark in the future, in
the same market in which the junior user used the potentially infringing mark. Id. at 365. The court stated,
however, that such an injunction would be appropriate if the owner of the mark made an appropriate showing
that it intended to use the mark in the relevant market. Id.
159. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
160. See infra note 176. Of course, the senior mark will be entitled to no dilution protection at all under the
Act if it is not already famous at the time that the junior mark is first used. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. IV
1998).
[VOL. 20:245
2000] DECIPHERING DILUTION UNDER THE FEDERAL TRADEMARKACT 271
commerce, the more likely it is that dilution will result."161  While this factor is
relevant to a determination of "likelihood of confusion" under a trademark
infringement analysis, ' Congress explicitly rendered "competition between the
owner of the famous mark and other parties" irrelevant to the dilution analysis.,
Moreover, it is precisely the use of a famous mark on noncompeting products
that constitutes the classic example of dilution. 6" Thus, the difference in the
fields of commerce between the respective marks should play no part in a dilu-
tion analysis.65
With respect to the "actual confusion" factor, the court found that actual con-
sumer confusion between the two marks would increase the likelihood of dilution
because "[c]onfusion lessens distinction."'" Similarly, the court held that greater
consumer sophistication lessens the likelihood of dilution because "[c]onsumers
who are highly familiar with the particular market segment are less likely to be
confused by similar marks and may discern quite subtle distinctions."'67 These
comments illustrate that despite the Act's clear language rendering consumer
confusion irrelevant to the dilution analysis, the Second Circuit has nonetheless
inappropriately considered the extent of consumer confusion in determining dilu-
tion. While the Second Circuit is correct that "confusion lessens distinction,"1"
the court is not correct that no dilution occurs when consumers are not "confused
by similar marks" but rather "discern quite subtle distinctions" between two such
marks. 9 As previously explained, it is the mental connection that consumers
make between the unauthorized junior mark and the senior mark holder, not the
consumers' belief as to the source of the goods bearing the unauthorized mark,
that determines whether dilution is occurring. "' This mental association may
exist regardless of whether consumers (1) mistakenly believe that products bear-
ing the junior mark are made by the senior mark owner or (2) correctly conclude
that the products bearing the junior mark come from a different source than the
senior mark owner. Therefore, the Second Circuit's importation of factors from
the likelihood of confusion analysis is inappropriate.
161. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 219.
162. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 E2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (holding that "the proximity
of the products" and "the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap" are relevant factors to infringe-
ment analysis).
163. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. IV 1998).
164. See supra note 89 and accompanying text; see also H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030 (listing KODAK pianos, BUICK aspirin, and DUPONT shoes as examples of
dilution).
165. For the same reasons that consideration of the distinctiveness of the senior mark and the proximity of the
products is improper, the court's consideration of the interrelationship among the distinctiveness of the senior
mark, the similarity of the junior mark, and the proximity of the products is also improper. See supra text
accompanying notes 152-54, 161-65.
166. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 221.
167. Id. at 220.
168. Id. at 221.
169. See id. at 220.
170. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text; supra Figure I accompanying notes 87-88.
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3. Affirmative Defenses
Finally, the court improperly included three factors that are more appropriately
considered as affirmative defenses to dilution rather than relevant considerations
to the dilution analysis itself. First, the court found that the adjectival or referen-
tial (i.e., descriptive) quality of a junior use would lessen the likelihood of dilu-
tion because descriptive uses of a mark are less likely to lead consumers to asso-
ciate the mark with the source of the product rather than with the product
itself" ' This factor, however, appears to be aimed at the same concerns as the
fair use defense, which, like all affirmative defenses, concerns itself not with the
liability of the defendant in the first instance but whether the defendant should
nonetheless be entitled to avoid that liability.' Specifically, the fair use defense
"permits others to use protected marks in descriptive ways, but not as marks
identifying their own products.""' 3 Thus, contrary to the Second Circuit's view in
Nabisco, the adjectival quality of the junior use of a mark is more appropriately
treated as an affirmative defense to dilution rather than as an element of dilution
itself.
Similarly, the court improperly considered the delay by the senior user and
resulting harm to the junior user, as well as the effect of the senior user's prior
laxity in protecting the mark as part of its dilution analysis.' Although it is true
that a senior user's laxity and delay in enforcing its mark and resulting harm to a
junior user will diminish the likelihood that a junior user will be held liable for
dilution, these factors have nothing to do with whether dilution has actually
occurred. Rather, these factors describe the equitable defense of estoppel by
laches,175 which prevents a senior user from enforcing its mark against a junior
user--even if dilution would otherwise occur-to protect the goodwill in a mark
that the junior user has accumulated during the senior mark holder's laxity and
delay in enforcing its trademark. 7 ' Accordingly, the Second Circuit's considera-
tion of both of these factors in the initial dilution analysis is improper.
After stripping away the irrelevant factors from the Second Circuit's dilution
analysis, only one factor remains: the similarity of the marks. As was true of the
171. Nabisco, 191 E3d at 221-22.
172. See, e.g., Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's USA Co., 125 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir.
1997) ("Fair use is a defense to liability under the Lanham Act even if a defendant's conduct would otherwise
constitute infringement of another's trademark.").
173. Id.; see also Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 E3d 258, 270-71 (5th Cir. 1999) ("The fair-use defense
allows a party to use a term in good faith to describe its goods or services, but only in actions involving
descriptive terms and only when the term is used in its descriptive sense rather than in its trademark sense.").
To the extent that this factor concerns the distinctiveness of the mark, it should be considered as pan of the
threshold "fame and distinctiveness" inquiry rather than the dilution inquiry itself. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 152-54.
174. Nabisco, 191 E3d at 222.
175. See Lighmin Chem. Co. v. Royal Home Prods., 197 F2d 668, 670 (C.C.P.A. 1952) (holding that the
defense of laches applies to infringement actions); Tustin Community Hosp., Inc. v. Santa Ana Community
Hosp. Ass'n, 89 Cal. App. 3d 889, 894 & n.I, 896, 153 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1979) (defining "estoppel by laches (as]
that type or degree of delay or inattention to duty which, when weighed with all other equitable considerations,
results in a bar to relief" and observing that "laches can be a defense to an injunction case based on unfair com-
petition [grounded in trademark infringement]").
176. See Nabisco, 191 F3d at 222 (noting that junior user "may already have accumulated substantial good-
will").
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Fourth Circuit's dilution test enunciated in Ringling Bros.," scrutiny of the test
in light of the federal Act reveals that this is the only pertinent consideration to
the dilution analysis.
C. The First Circuit s Virtual Identity Test in Lund
Curiously, neither the Fourth Circuit's nor the Second Circuit's dilution opin-
ions discussed in any detail the dilution test set forth in an earlier First Circuit
opinion, LP Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co.'78 In that case, the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered whether the district court had
properly issued a preliminary injunction barring the defendants from selling a
single-control wall-mounted faucet that allegedly diluted the trade dress of the
plaintiffs' own faucet under the Dilution Act."' The First Circuit vacated the
injunction, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish (1) that the design of
their faucet was sufficiently famous to qualify for protection under the Dilution
Act, and (2) that the defendants' "largely dissimilar" faucet design diluted the
plaintiffs' faucet design."8
With respect to the fame requirement of the Dilution Act, the court found that
the fame standard was difficult to satisfy. The court first observed that the leg-
islative history for predecessor bills, in addition to the Act itself, "indicate a con-
gressional intent that courts should be discriminating and selective in categoriz-
ing a mark as famous."'' Similarly, the court found that "[b]oth the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition and the state anti-dilution statutes against the
background of which Congress enacted the [Act] make clear that the standard for
fame and distinctiveness required to obtain anti-dilution protection is more rigor-
ous than that required to seek infringement protection." '82 Further, it held that
"national renown is an important factor in determining whether a mark qualifies
as famous," although no "explicit finding" of national renown is required.'83 The
court then concluded that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy this exacting
standard.'
84
The court then turned to the dilution inquiry, exerting particular effort not to
confound the dilution analysis with the likelihood of confusion analysis used in
straightforward infringement proceedings. The court began by observing that
dilution protection is not "mere fallback protection for trademark owners unable
to prove trademark infringement" but rather a remedy for a distinct type of
harm. " The court next dismissed the Sweet factors as "'the offspring of classi-
177. See supra Part WVA.
178. 163 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1998).
179. Id. at 32. Courts have applied the Dilution Act to trade dress consisting of a product's design in addition
to the more familiar word marks. See, e.g., id. at 45 ("[Tihe Act applies to all types of marks recognized by the
Lanham Act, including marks derived from product designs."); Sunbeam Prods. v. West Bend Co., 39
U.S.P.Q.2d 1545, 49-54 (S.D. Miss. 1996) (applying Dilution Act to design of a mixer), afftd, 123 F3d 246 (5th
Cir. 1997).
180. Lund, 163 F.3d at 47, 50.
181. Id. at 46.
182. Id. at 47.
183. Id. at 47 & n.1 .
184. See id. at 47.
185. Id. at48.
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cal likelihood of confusion analysis and ... not particularly relevant or helpful in
resolving the issues of dilution by blurring."" 8 The court then devised a dilution
test that focused exclusively on the similarity of the marks, holding that the
appropriate inquiry was "whether target customers are likely to view the products
[i.e., their trade dress] 'as essentially the same."'"
Of all the tests for dilution that courts have applied, the Lund "virtual identity"
test best accords with both the Schechterian concept of dilution and congression-
al intent to protect the unique bond between a famous mark and the product(s)
that it identifies, while at the same time guarding against an overly broad appli-
cation of dilution.'" By protecting (1) only truly famous marks from (2) only
near imitations and exact replications, the test properly captures the essence of
the dilution analysis: dilution occurs only where the senior mark is sufficiently
well-known, and the junior mark sufficiently similar, that consumers form the
requisite mental association between the two marks, which weakens the ability of
the senior mark to identify the product(s) to which it is affixed. Moreover, the
strict Lund test ensures that trademark law is not transformed into the absolute
property right protection offered by the patent and copyright laws, but rather pri-
marily guards against consumer source confusion, the goal of the traditional
trademark infringement regime.
CONCLUSION
Coming to terms with dilution under the Dilution Act is understandably diffi-
cult. The definition of dilution under the Act, in its comparative minimalism,
laid itself open to multifarious interpretations. Thus, the current disagreement
among the circuit courts on the proper test for dilution was, perhaps, a foregone
conclusion.
Dilution, as originally proposed by Schechter, represented a dramatically dif-
ferent sort of protection for trademarks than that offered by traditional trademark
infringement law, and courts confronted with this legislative fait accompli
embodied in state anti-dilution statutes reacted with antipathy and confusion.
Judicial decisions rendering state dilution protection subservient to the tradition-
al likelihood of confusion analysis may have resulted from (1) an attempt to rec-
oncile two visions of trademark law in an incompatible way or (2) the effect of a
series of judicial attempts to limit the effect of a judicially disfavored doctrine.
While the motivations are uncertain, this much is clear: far more often than not,
state dilution statutes were woefully misapplied.
186. Id. at 49 (quoting [4] MCCARTHY, supra note 32, § 24.94.1). The court also dismissed the test applied by
the district court in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel
Development-i.e., whether the junior mark had '"caused a lessening of demand for the product or services
bearing the famous mark'--observing that "demand for one product is almost always lessened whenever a
competing product achieves a measurable degree of success." Id. at 49 (quoting Ringling Bros.-Barnum &
Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955 . Supp. 605, 616 (E.D. Va. 1997), affd, 170 F3d
449 (4th Cir. 1999)).
187. Id. at 50 (citation omitted). In a trade dress case involving a product configuration, the product's design
constitutes the mark.
188. See generally H.R. REp. No. 104-374, at 3-4 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030-31;
Schechter, supra note 38, at 825-26, 830-31.
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It should not come as a shock, then, to see similar judicial obstacles trip up the
federal Dilution Act. If one carefully examines the language of the Act and its
legislative history, one finds a simple protection. Dilution, the Act says, is the
attenuation of the mental association between a famous mark and the products to
which it is affixed by the unauthorized use of the same or a substantially similar
mark on other products-a concept that is essentially equivalent to that proposed
by Schechter in his original exposition of dilution. In the words of the Fourth
Circuit, "[a]s proposed by Schechter, the interest was easily identified as simply
the mark's 'uniqueness'. . . and the harm, as [the] loss of that uniqueness.", 9
Yet courts continue to misapply the concept under the federal Act, as they had
done under state anti-dilution statutes. Just as Judge Sweet's test for dilution
inappropriately considers irrelevant factors to the dilution analysis under state
law, so, too, do the Ringling-Bros. "economic harm" test and the Nabisco "open-
ended" test improperly examine factors that have no bearing on dilution under
federal law. The "economic harm" test inappropriately disregards the preemp-
tive, rather than remedial, nature of the Act and ironically renders it most diffi-
cult for a mark owner to demonstrate dilution in precisely those cases where
Congress most clearly intended dilution protection to apply-the use of identical
or similar marks on dissimilar, noncompeting products. The "open-ended" test,
in making a laudable attempt at further exploration of the contours of dilution
doctrine before any decisive rule is laid down, misunderstands the essential sim-
plicity of the doctrine. Where there is use of the same mark or a substantially
similar mark on any product, there is dilution, provided that the senior mark is
sufficiently famous to trigger the requisite consumer mental association between
the two marks. No analysis outside the boundaries of such a definition should
occur.
Only the Lund court, in adopting the "virtual identity" test, appears to have
understood both the simplicity of the doctrine and its differentiation from the
likelihood of confusion analysis. In enforcing a rigorous fame requirement and
limiting dilution analysis to a determination of whether there is virtual identity of
the senior and junior marks, the court appropriately resisted the urge to embellish
the doctrine with unnecessary, irrelevant, and unjustifiably restrictive factors,
although discussion of what ought to be considered in determining "virtual iden-
tity" would also have been helpful. Still, the First Circuit in Lund has been the
most faithful appellate court thus far to apply the Dilution Act as Congress
intended (and Schechter envisioned), without tainting its application with likeli-
hood of confusion or other irrelevant or redundant considerations (like the
Second Circuit) or emasculating its protection altogether (like the Fourth
Circuit). Although substantial judicial controversy currently exists concerning
the appropriate dilution test under the federal Act, perhaps a judicial consensus
will soon form around the First Circuit's test.19 0 Otherwise, in the apt words of
189. Ringling Bros., 170 F3d at 456.
190. Early results in this regard are not promising. As previously noted, the Fifth Circuit recently adopted the
Fourth Circuit's erroneous test, while the Third Circuit chose to follow the Second Circuit's misguided analysis.
See supra notes 14, 16.
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the Fourth Circuit (which ironically did not heed its own warning), "once the
dilution concept is sought to be given any form other than that of Schechter's
simple original proposal it begins to lose its coherence as a legally enforceable
non-n."
19 1
191. Ringling Bros., 170 F3d at 455-56.
